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1. INTRODUCTION
Nearly five years ago, the Free Trade Commission (FTC) created by
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) issued "Notes of
Interpretation" (Notes) purporting to restrict the minimum standard of
treatment under NAFTA's investment chapter (Chapter 11) to the
requirements of customary international law.2 A controversy ensued
regarding the Notes' status as a reasonable interpretation falling within,3
* Croft Associate Professor of International Law and Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer,
University of Mississippi School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support
provided by Dean Samuel M. Davis and the University of Mississippi School of Law, as well as
access to the library at the George Washington Law School arranged by Associate Dean Susan L.
Karamanian. A version of this Article previously was circulated in the newsletter of the
Committee on Commercial Dispute Resolution of the ABA's Section of International Law and
Practice.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2001, 107
Stat. 2066, 32 I.L.M. 605, 693 [hereinafter NAFTA] (establishing a Free Trade Commission that
consists of cabinet-level representatives of the three NAFTA Parties).
2. NAFTA FTC, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, § B (July 31,
2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-lnterpr-en.asp [hereinafter
Notes].
3. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award 125-26, ICSID Case No.
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or as an amendment falling outside of,4 the FTC's mandate. While
tribunals and many observers have declared their allegiance to each of
the opposing views, few have supported their conclusions with detailed
analysis of sources, including NAFTA, the Notes, relevant decisions, or
the minimum standard's historical foundation in general principles of
law accepted by developed legal systems.' Seeking to provide a more
complete and nuanced account, this Article draws a distinction between
the exclusion of treaty obligations and the exclusion of general
ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/22094.pdf [hereinafter Loewen Award]; United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v.
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction 97 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.
dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Jurisdiction%2OAward.22Nov02.pdf [hereinafter UPS
Award on Jurisdiction]; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Award 120-21, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/14442.pdf [hereinafter Mondev Award]; Michael Ewing-Chow, Investor Protection
in Free Trade Agreements: Lessons from North America, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 748, 769
(2001); Stefan Matiation, Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free Trade
Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 451, 487-
88, 494-95 (2003); J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
433, 454 (2002); Courtney C. Kirkman, Note, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United
States and the Narrowing Scope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 343, 383,
391 (2002).
4. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages 47 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/
damage award.pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages]; Second Opinion
of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C., at 4-5 (Sept. 6, 2001), in Methanex Corp. v. United States
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/
MethanexResubAmendStateClaimAppend.pdf [hereinafter Second Opinion of Professor Sir
Robert Jennings]; Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 397 (2003); Charles H. Brower, II,
Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 486 n.142
(2002) [hereinafter Brower, Beware the Jabberwock]; Charles H. Brower, II, Fair and Equitable
Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 9, 10 (2002)
[hereinafter Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment]; Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State
Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 56 n.71
(2001) [hereinafter Brower, Empire Strikes Back]; Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes
Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 78 n.249 (2002)
[hereinafter Brower, Fear and Equilibrium]; Charles N. Brower, NAFTA's Investment Chapter:
Dynamic Laboratory, Failed Experiments, and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 251, 255 (2003) [hereinafter Brower, Dynamic Laboratory]; Ian Laird, Betrayal, Shock
and Outrage-Recent Developments in NAFTA Article 1105, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 49, 49 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004); William W. Park, The Specificity of International
Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1305 (2003); Todd
Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International Economic Law, 36 CAN.
Bus. L.J. 405, 428-29 (2002) [hereinafter Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration]; Todd Weiler,
NAFTA Investment Law in 2001: As the Legal Order Starts to Settle, the Bureaucrats Strike Back,
36 INT'L L. 345, 347 (2002) [hereinafter Weiler, Bureaucrats Strike Back].
5. See Matiation, supra note 3, at 468-95; Kirkman, supra note 3, at 381-92 (providing two
of the most comprehensive, yet still incomplete, analyses of the Notes).
2006] PARTIAL AMENDMENT OF NAFTA ARTICLE 1105
principles of law from the minimum standard of treatment. To the extent
that the Notes prevent direct incorporation of free-standing treaty
obligations into the minimum standard, they constitute a reasonable
interpretation,6 which most tribunals have accepted.7 To the extent that
the Notes exclude general principles of law from the minimum standard,
they constitute an ultra vires amendment,8 which virtually all tribunals
have ignored.' Thus, as is so often the case, a measure of truth lies on
each side of the debate.'o
II. THE MINIMUM STANDARD: TEXT, AMBIGUITIES, AND EARLY
CASES
In ratifying NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the United States resolved
to "ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business
planning and investment,"' "increase substantially investment
opportunities in the[ir] territories, "2 and "create effective procedures
for.. .the resolution of disputes."'3 Chapter 11 implements these
objectives by identifying the standards for treatment of investors and
establishing procedures for arbitration of investor-state disputes. 4
One may divide Chapter 11 into two sections. The first, Section A,
establishes the NAFTA Parties' substantive obligations with respect to
each others' investors. 5  For example, Article 1110 permits
expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation only for a
public purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with due
6. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
10. Cf Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 1492, 1525-26 (2004) (opining that the Notes "occupy a peculiar middle ground between
interpretation and law creation"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 325 cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (explaining that the
distinction between interpretation and amendment "may be imperceptible in some instances");
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 193 (2003) (observing that the
"distinction between interpretation and amendment is not always easy to draw").
11. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 297.
12. Id. art. 102(l)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
13. Id. art. 102(l)(e), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
14. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 4, at 48.
15. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1101-14, 32 I.L.M. at 639-42; see also Brower, Empire
Strikes Back, supra note 4, at 48-49; Brower, Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 46; Charles
H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 40-41 (2003) [hereinafter Brower, Legitimacy].
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process of law, and upon prompt payment of fair market value (plus
interest) in freely transferable funds. 6 Furthermore, Articles 1102 and
1103 establish obligations of nondiscrimination by requiring NAFTA
Parties to treat each others' investors no less favorably than they would
treat their own investors (national treatment) or investors from third
states (MFN treatment) in like circumstances. 7 Finally, and most
importantly for purposes of this Article, Section A articulates a
minimum standard of treatment for investments, which mandates
"treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment."' 8
Section B of Chapter 11 secures the NAFTA Parties' substantive
obligations by "establish[ing] a mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors
of the Parties.. .and due process before an impartial tribunal."' 9 Thus,
investors may submit claims alleging breaches of Section A to
arbitration before ad hoc tribunals constituted under the ICSID
Convention (if the investor's home state and the disputing NAFTA
Party are both states parties to that convention),2" the Additional Facility
Rules of ICSID (if either the investor's home state or the disputing
NAFTA Party is a state party to the ICSID Convention), or the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 2' Once constituted, tribunals must
render decisions in accordance with NAFTA and other "applicable rules
of international law."22 In addition, their liberty of decision remains
subject to the FTC's competence to issue binding interpretations of (but
not amendments to) NAFTA provisions.2 3
16. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 11 10(1)-(6), 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.
17. See id. arts. 1102 (national treatment), 1103 (MFN treatment), 32 I.L.M. at 639.
18. See id. art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. at 639.
19. Id. art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
20. The "ICSID Convention" means the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139, 32 I.L.M. at 647.
21. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120(1), 32 I.L.M. at 643. Presently, the United States is a
state party to the ICSID Convention, but Canada and Mexico are not. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada,
Decision Regarding the Place of Arbitration (Nov. 28, 1997), reprinted in 38 1.L.M. 702, 703 n.5
(1999).
22. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(1), 32 I.L.M. at 645.
23. Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131(2), 32 I.L.M. at 645 (authorizing the Free
Trade Commission to adopt binding interpretations of NAFTA provisions), with id. art. 2202, 32
I.L.M. at 702 (permitting the NAFTA Parties to adopt modifications of or additions to NAFTA
provisions, which take effect only after approval "in accordance with the applicable legal
procedures of each Party"). See also Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 4,
17-19; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 4, at 56 n.71; Brower, Fair and Equitable
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During the first wave of Chapter 11 claims, Article 1105(1)'s vague
text quickly raised interpretive questions, which the investor-driven,
uncoordinated dispute settlement process could not resolve to the
NAFTA Parties' satisfaction. For disputes arising under Article 1105(1),
interpretive debate focused on two phrases: "international law" and "fair
and equitable treatment."24 With regard to "international law," disputes
called on tribunals to decide whether the term referred to all sources of
international law or whether it contained an unstated restriction to
customary international law.2" With regard to "fair and equitable
treatment," disputes required tribunals to identify the proper reference
points for assessing the fairness and equity of measures adopted or
maintained by host states.26 Given the dearth of precedent27 and the
substantial dollar amounts in controversy," tribunals undertook adifficult task in the face of intense scrutiny.29
Treatment, supra note 4, at 10; Brower, Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 78 n.249; Brower,
Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 84; David A. Gantz, International Decision: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 937, 945 (2003); Matiation, supra note 3, at 479; Swaine, supra note
10, at 1526 n.128; Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 288 n.194 (2002); Kirkman, supra
note 3, at 372-73.
24. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 4, at 53-55; Brower, Fear and Equilibrium,
supra note 4, at 75-77.
25. See Loewen Award, supra note 3, 124; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 4, at
53-54; Brower, Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 75-76; Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of
NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and
Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1427 (2003); Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of
Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of
WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 493, 497-98 (2003).
26. Loewen Award, supra note 3, 124; Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 4, at 54-
55; Brower, Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 77; Coe, supra note 25, at 1427-28.
27. Although bilateral investment treaties (BITs) frequently referred to the obligation of host
states to provide "fair and equitable treatment," virtually no case law addressed the meaning of
that term before the advent of Chapter 11 disputes. See Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note
4, at 54-55; Brower, Fear and Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 77; see also F.A. Mann, British
Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 243;
John A. Westberg & Bertrand P. Marchais, General Principles Governing Foreign Investment as
Articulated in Recent International Tribunal Awards and Writings of Publicists, in IBRAHIM F.I.
SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 337, 353 (1993).
28. See Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 4, at 9; Brower, Legitimacy, supra
note 15, at 68 (both observing that the Chapter 11 disputes then pending placed "over $2 billion
in controversy").
29. See Coe, supra note 25, at 1385 ("NAFTA's investor-state docket has generated
predictably high levels of interest among international law scholars and practitioners. It has also
sustained a remarkable collection of observers beyond specialist circles. Numerous critiques have
issued from both groups....").
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After Mexico successfully defended an arbitration in which Article
1105(1) played a peripheral role,3°  tribunals articulated broad
interpretations of the same provision and imposed liability on the
respondent states in a series of three cases decided under Chapter 11. In
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, the tribunal construed "fair
and equitable treatment" to encompass obligations of transparency
similar to those articulated in other chapters of NAFTA. 3" Later, in S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal held that the infringement of any
"rule of international law...specifically designed to protect investors
will tend to weigh heavily in favour of finding a breach of Article
1105.,,3' Applying this logic, a majority of the tribunal held that
Canada's "breach of Article 1102 [relating to national treatment]
essentially establishe[d] a breach of Article 1105 as well."33 Finally, in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal held that, despite textual
indications to the contrary, fair and equitable treatment requires not only
compliance with international law, but also with the "ordinary
standards" of fairness "applied in the [domestic legal systems of the]
NAFTA countries.
Taken as a whole, the Metalclad, S.D. Myers, and Pope & Talbot
awards created both the opportunity and the motive for the FTC to issue
an "interpretation" of Article 1105(1). Because the three awards adopted
different reference points for evaluating claims under Article 1105(1),
the NAFTA Parties could reasonably conclude that circumstances
provided the opportunity for much needed clarification of the provision
30. Azinian v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (NAFTA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 1999), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp_pages/importa/
sol contro/consultoria/Casos Mexico/Robert Azinian/RobertAzinian.htm.
31. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award 71, 76, 88, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2000), available at http://www.economia-
snci.gob.rnx/sphp-pages/importa/solcontro/consultoria/Casos-Mexico/Metalclad/Metalclad.htm.
According to some observers, the tribunal directly incorporated the provisions of other chapters
into Article 1105. See, e.g., United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664, 66,
68, 70-73 (2001), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/01/06/2001bcscO664.htm;
Thomas, supra note 3, at 438, 449. In this author's view, the tribunal properly referred to the
provisions of other chapters as context for defining the scope of "fair and equitable treatment"
under Article 1105(1). See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 4, at 468-70.
32. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award 264 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2000),
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialaward-fmal_
13-11 -00.pdf [hereinafter S.D. Myers Partial Award].
33. Id. 266.
34. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 110-13, 118 (NAFTA
Ch. I Arb. Trib. 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Award_
Merits-e.pdf.
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by the FTC.35 Furthermore, notwithstanding their differences, the three
awards arguably marked a trend toward relatively broad interpretations
of Article 1105(1).16 Because this trend developed just as a series of
claims approached critical junctures in the Chapter 11 arbitration
pipeline, circumstances provided the NAFTA Parties with the motive to
use an FTC interpretation as the vehicle to preempt further losses.37
III. THE NOTES OF INTERPRETATION: CONTENT AND CONTROVERSY
Surrendering to opportunity and motive, the FTC adopted its first
(and, to date, only) Notes of Interpretation on July 31, 2001. The Notes
provide, in relevant part, that:
35. See Notes, supra note 2, pmbl. ("Having reviewed the operation of proceedings conducted
under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Free Trade Commission
hereby adopts the following interpretations of Chapter Eleven in order to clarify...the meaning of
certain of its provisions....") (emphasis added); Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages,
supra note 4, 25 & n.9:
The interpretation of Article 1105 has proved particularly difficult for various tribunals
and, indeed, for the NAFTA Parties themselves. This Tribunal has grappled with the
stark inconsistencies between the provisions of BITs and corresponding commitments in
Article 1105. Other tribunals have laboured over the relationships between Article 1105
and other commitments in Chapter 11 as well as commitments made by the NAFTA
Parties in other agreements. And the NAFTA Parties themselves found it necessary to
promulgate the Interpretation.... Had the NAFTA Parties not perceived an ambiguity,
no interpretation would have been necessary.
Cf. Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 66-68 (discussing the emergence of decisions
inconsistently interpreting Article 1105(1) and warning of the threat that doctrinal incoherence
poses to institutional legitimacy).
36. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 333 (2d ed.
2004) (explaining that "[i]n the early litigation under NAFTA, there was a clear preference for the
expansive interpretation of the phrase [fair and equitable treatment]"); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between
Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2144
(2004) (concluding that the NAFTA Parties adopted the Notes "in response to several broad panel
readings of the obligations articulated in.. Article [1105(1)]"); Kirkman, supra note 3, at 389
(observing that "[p]rior to the issuance of the FTC Interpretation on July 31, 2001, NAFTA
jurisprudence indicated a trend towards an expansive view of Article 1105's fair and equitable
treatment provision").
37. See Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, supra note 4, at 4-5; Laird, supra
note 4, at 55; Brower, Dynamic Laboratory, supra note 4, at 256; Brower, Legitimacy, supra note
15, at 81; Ewing-Chow, supra note 3, at 769; David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment
Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 679, 687, 713 (2004); see also Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, pt. IV, ch. C,
18 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/51052.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Final Award] (recounting the United States'
observation that "every NAFTA claimant in cases pending in 2001 has argued that the FTC
interpretation was specifically targeted against it").
354 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment....
The concept[] of "fair and equitable treatment"...do[es] not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment....
A determination that there has been a breach of another provision
of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not
establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).38
Evidently, the Notes represent an effort to "overrule" the Metalclad,
S.D. Myers, and Pope & Talbot awards39 by limiting Article 1105(1) to
the obligations established by customary international law.4" Thus, the
first sentence connects the minimum standard of treatment to customary
international law. The second sentence excludes from the minimum
standard all legal obligations that exceed the scope of customary
international law. For good measure, the third sentence provides that the
minimum standard does not require compliance with free-standing
treaty obligations.
Immediately after their release, the Notes began to generate
controversy.41 Certain objections related to issues of process and timing.
Because the Notes appeared "out of the blue," "without any prior public
consultation," and without giving "any warning to investors party to
ongoing Chapter 11 arbitrations,"42 some observers have described them
as a crude and self-interested form of political intervention designed to
38. Notes, supra note 2, § B.
39. Kirkman, supra note 3, at 390; see also Mondev Award, supra note 3, 103; Laird, supra
note 4, at 62, 65; Ewing-Chow, supra note 3, at 769; Gantz, supra note 37, at 713; Jurgen Kurtz,
A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the
OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 713, 754-55 (2002);
Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property
Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 853 n.10 (2003); Swaine, supra note 10, at 1525 n.125; Weiler,
Bureaucrats Strike Back, supra note 4, at 347.
40. Gantz, supra note 37, at 687; Gantz, supra note 23, at 945; Carlos G. Garcia, All the
Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of
Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301, 349 (2004).
41. See Gantz, supra note 37, at 699; Matiation, supra note 3, at 470; see also Coe, supra
note 25, at 1429.
42. Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 81 & n.238 (quoting ADF Group, Inc. v. United
States, Investor's Reply to the Counter-Memorial of the United States on Competence and
Liability 213, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7920.pdf).
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influence the outcome of pending disputes. 3 Other objections raised
issues of content. While Article 1105(1) refers to "international law,"
the Notes narrow that term to embrace only one of its three major
components (i.e., "customary international law"), thereby eliminating
the foundations of formerly viable claims." Under the circumstances,
some observers have accused the FTC of exceeding its interpretive
powers and producing an amendment that cannot enter into force
without ratification in accordance with the constitutional processes of
all three NAFTA Parties.45
Compared to the heated debate in academic journals, the decisions of
arbitral tribunals seem to reflect much lower levels of criticism for the
Notes. Although one tribunal expressed its inclination to view the Notes
as an amendment, 46 seven tribunals later declined to challenge the Notes
because (1) the tribunals agreed with the Notes in relevant part, 47 (2) the
claimants abandoned their challenges to the Notes at oral argument or
maintained that they should prevail even under the Notes, 48 or (3) the
tribunals felt they lacked competence to opine on the validity of FTC
actions.49 While some observers understandably regard this trend as
legitimation of the Notes' promulgation, 5° a close reading of the awards
reveals a mixed and more nuanced assessment of the FTC action. As
43. See, e.g., Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 4, at 485-87; Brower, Legitimacy,
supra note 15, at 81-82; Charles H. Brower, II, Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration, and the
Law of State Immunity, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907, 924-27 (2005); see also Verhoosel, supra
note 25, at 499 (explaining that because the ."interpretation' was adopted when various Chapter
11 Tribunals were in the process of hearing claims under Article 1105(1)," the FTC's action
"understandably caus[ed] fury and concern among those investors as well as fierce debate among
many academic observers").
44. Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 4, 7 20,25 n.9, 46-47.
45. See supra notes 4 & 23 and accompanying text.
46. Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 4, 47 (dicta).
47. Methanex Final Award, supra note 37, pt. IV, ch. C, TT 17, 20; UPS Award on
Jurisdiction, supra note 3, 97; Mondev Award, supra note 3, 7 120-121.
48. GAMI Inv., Inc. v. United Mexican States, Final Award 92 n.14 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. 2004), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp_pages/importa/sol-contro/
consultoria/CasosMexico/Gami/escritos/GAMI english.pdf [hereinafter GAMI Award]; Loewen
Award, supra note 3, 127.
49. ADF Group Inc. v. United States, Award 177, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/I (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf
[hereinafter ADF Award]. Another tribunal appeared to accept the Notes without discussion.
Waste Mgrnt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award 90-91, 96-97, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004), available at http://www.economia-
snci. gob.mx/sphppages/importa/sol contro/consultoria/CasosMexico/Waste 2_management/
laudo/laudo ingles.pdf [hereinafter Waste Mgmt. Award].
50. See, e.g., Coe, supra note 25, at 1429.
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explained below, to the extent that the Notes prevent direct
incorporation of free-standing treaty obligations into the minimum
standard of treatment, most awards have rightly concurred or
acquiesced. 1 To the extent that the Notes of Interpretation exclude
general principles of law from the minimum standard of treatment,
however, tribunals have quietly ignored and, thus, tacitly rejected
them.52
IV. EXCLUSION OF FREE-STANDING TREATY OBLIGATIONS: A
REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
Whether performed by arbitral tribunals or by the FTC,
interpretations of NAFTA provisions must conform to the customary
rules of treaty interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 3 Thus, interpretations of NAFTA by tribunals or by
the FTC should give effect to the ordinary meaning of terms taken in
context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose. 4 However, the
51. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
53. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(2), 32 I.L.M. at 297 (instructing the NAFTA Parties to
"interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement... in accordance with applicable rules of
international law"); id. art. 1131(1), 32 I.L.M. at 645 (instructing tribunals to do the same).
Tribunals and observers uniformly recognize that the applicable rules include the principles set
forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See, e.g., UPS Award on Jurisdiction,
supra note 3, 40; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Award on Jurisdiction 7 97-102 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf;
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to
Competence and Jurisdiction 51, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3921.pdf, S.D. Myers Partial
Award, supra note 32, 7 196-204; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award 65-68
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2000), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/pubdoc7.pdf; Metalclad Award, supra note 31, 70; Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United
Mexican States, Award § 9, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2000),
available at http://www. economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp_pages/importa/solcontro/consultoria/
CasosMexico/Waste _management/laudo/000602_Laudo eningles.pdf; Ethyl Corp. v.
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction 7 55-56 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/ethyl6.pdf; Brower, Beware the Jabberwock,
supra note 4, at 468-69; Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 4, at 9; Brower,
Legitimacy, supra note 15, at 79-80; David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights
and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 651,
689-90 (2001); Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration, supra note 4, at 428.
54. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,340.
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Vienna Convention also provides that a "special meaning shall be given
to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 55
Viewed in isolation, the ordinary meaning of "international law"
includes the three principal sources listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice: 56 treaties, customary international
law, and general principles of law recognized by the world's principal
legal systems.57 If one takes this as the definition of "international law"
for purposes of the minimum standard, the Notes seem to modify
Article 1105(1) by excluding treaties,58 the most important source of
international law in the modern era."
Of course, one cannot construe the phrase "international law" in
isolation. To the contrary, one must interpret it in context. 6' For Article
1105(1), the relevant context includes Articles 1116 and 1117, which
authorize investors to bring claims before ad hoc tribunals only for
measures alleged to violate obligations established by Section A of
Chapter 11 or by two provisions in Chapter 15 of NAFTA.61 In other
words, the NAFTA Parties consented to investor-state arbitration only
for claims alleging violations of enumerated NAFTA provisions, 62 but
not for claims alleging violations of other NAFTA provisions,63 much
55. Id. art. 31(4). As logic would dictate, the burden of proof rests on the party that seeks to
establish a special meaning. AUST, supra note 10, at 196.
56. Methanex Final Award, supra note 37, pt. II, ch. B, T 3; UPS Award on Jurisdiction,
supra note 3, 77; Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 4, 7 20, 25 n.9, 46;
Gantz, supra note 37, at 714; J.C. Thomas, Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11,
1999 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 106; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (6th ed. 2003) ("Article 38 is generally regarded as a complete statement
of the sources of international law."); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (5th ed.
2003) ("Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is widely recognised as
the most authoritative statement as to the sources of international law.").
57. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993. Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute also refers to judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists "as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law." Properly understood, that phrase designates judicial decisions and teachings as evidence of
international law, but not an independent source of international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note
10, § 102(1), § 102 reporters' note I, § 103(2), § 103 cmt. a.
58. Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 4, 7 20, 46-47; Kirkman,
supra note 3, at 383.
59. SHAW, supra note 56, at 89.
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1116(1), 1117(1), 32 I.L.M. at 642-43; Mondev Award,
supra note 3, 121 & n.5 1; Thomas, supra note 3, at 449.
62. UPS Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 3, 69; Mondev Award, supra note 3, 121;
Thomas, supra note 3, at 449.
63. Mondev Award, supra note 3, 121; Thomas, supra note 3, at 450.
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less the provisions of other treaties.64 When interpreting Article 1105(1),
one should not use it as a vehicle to reincorporate independent treaty
provisions because that would subvert Chapter 1l 's jurisdictional
limitations.65 Thus, whether viewed as context or as evidence of the
intent to adopt a special meaning, Articles 1116 and 1117 imply that
Article 1 105(1)'s reference to "international law" excludes independent
treaty obligations. To the extent that they make the same point
explicitly, the Notes appear to fall within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation.66
V. EXCLUSION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: UNLAWFUL AND
INEFFECTIVE AMENDMENT
As stated above, the Notes exclude from the minimum standard of
treatment all obligations that exceed the scope of customary
international law.67 Since general principles constitute a source of
international law for situations not addressed by custom or treaty,68 the
Notes logically exclude general principles as an independent source of
obligation under Article 1105(1).69 Because general principles typically
64. Mondev Award, supra note 3, 121; Gantz, supra note 37, at 715; Matiation, supra note
3, at 487.
65. Thomas, supra note 3, at 449-50; Kirkman, supra note 3, at 383, 391.
66. Methanex Final Award, supra note 37, pt. IV, ch. C, 17; UPS Award on Jurisdiction,
supra note 3, 9 97; Mondev Award, supra note 3, 9 119-21; Matiation, supra note 3, at 487-88,
494-95; Thomas, supra note 3, at 449-50; Kirkman, supra note 3, at 383, 391. Although Article
1105(1) does not justify direct incorporation of free-standing treaty norms, certain treaty
obligations may remain or become pertinent to its interpretation. For example, to the extent that
treaties codify existing custom, their content should influence the application of Article 1105(1).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 102 reporters' note 5; Matiation, supra note 3, at 487.
Alternatively, the widespread adoption of multilateral or bilateral treaties may reflect state
practice sufficient to influence the development of custom and, thus, the meaning of Article
1105(1). Mondev Award, supra note 3, 99 117, 125; Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of
Damages, supra note 4, 62; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 102(3), § 102 cmt. i; Laird, supra
note 4, at 67; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 129-30 (2003).
67. See supra notes 38 & 40 and accompanying text.
68. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 102 cmt. 1; SHAW, supra note 56, at 93.
69. Alternatively, the Notes might reflect an endorsement of the discredited minority view
formerly espoused by Soviet legal scholars that general principles merely constitute a subset of
customary international law. See SHAW, supra note 56, at 94 (attributing this view to Soviet
writers, but opining that "most writers are prepared to accept that the general principles do
constitute a separate source of law"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 102 reporters'
note 7 (concluding that "the view of Soviet scholars ... has not gained acceptance"). Although one
might regard the NAFTA Parties' willingness to endorse the former Soviet view as highly
improbable, the United States arguably did so in its new Model BIT and in recently concluded
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play a limited role in the development of international law,7" one might
treat their omission either as insignificant or as a reasonable
interpretation because the NAFTA Parties did not consider such a trivial
source of "international law" when drafting Article 1105(1). Such a
view would, however, prove unsound because it ignores the important
contributions that general principles have made to the law of state
responsibility and protection of foreign investment.
While treaties and custom dominate most areas of international law,
general principles "have long played an important role in the
articulation of the principles of international state responsibility insofar
as they concern interference with persons."'" Likewise, with respect to
the protection of foreign investment, general principles have provided
much of the "fodder" for claims and, consequently, have acquired a
substantial role in shaping the law.72 For example, when introducing
Harvard's Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of
States for Injuries to Aliens, Professors Sohn and Baxter described the
international minimum standard of treatment in the following terms:
"[N]ational treatment may suffice, unless the national standard departs
unreasonably from the general principles accepted by the principal legal
investment and trade agreements, all of which first prescribe "customary international law" as the
minimum standard of treatment for covered investments, but then define that standard to include
"the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world." 2004 United
States Model BIT, art. 5(l)-(2)(a), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
38710.pdf; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Oct.
25, 2004, U.S.-Uru., art. 5(1)-(2)(a), at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World Regions/Americas/
South_America/UruguayBIT/assetuploadfile583_6728.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, June 15,
2004, U.S.-Morocco, art. 10.5(1)-(2)(a), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/
Bilateral/MoroccoFTA/FlnalText/Section Index.html; U.S.-Central American Free Trade
Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep., art. 10.5(l)-(2)(a), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR FinalTexts/Section_
Index.html; Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 10.4(1)-(2)(a), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final Texts/Section-Index.html; Free
Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., art. 15.5(l)-(2)(a), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final Texts/Section Index.html.
70. See MANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 102 (1944);
SHAW, supra note 56, at 94; Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 801, 817 (1976); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, Part I, Introductory Note,
at 18 ("International law is made in two principal ways-by the practice of states [']customary
law['] and by purposeful agreement among states (sometimes called [']conventional law['], i.e.,
law by convention, by agreement."); SORNARAJAH, supra note 36, at 93 ("Positivist legal
scholars.. treat custom and treaty solely as the significant sources of international law.").
71. Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of
International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 290 (1963).
72. SORNARAJAH, supra note 36, at 93-94.
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systems."73 Furthermore, Professors Sohn and Baxter emphasized that
they had found it "necessary" to include express references to general
principles of law in several provisions, including articles on:
1. justification for state action;75
2. arrest and detention; 7
6
3. denial of justice;77
4. destruction of and damage to property;78
5. taking and deprivation of use or enjoyment of property;79
6. violation, annulment, and modification of contracts and
concessions;8" and
7. lack of due diligence in protecting aliens.81
Contemporaneously, Lord Arnold McNair (former President of the
International Court of Justice) and Professor Wolfgang Friedmann of
Columbia University commended general principles as the most
appropriate source of law for natural resource concessions and other
long-term economic arrangements between states and foreign
investors,8 2 which incorporate elements of public interest and private
commerce. 3 In writings of a more recent vintage, Professors Ian
Brownlie 4 and Malcolm Shaw 5 discuss the role played by general
principles in leading cases frequently cited in the pleadings and
decisions of investment claims: AMCO Asia v. Republic of Indonesia,86
the Barcelona Traction case," and the Chorz6w Factory case."
73. Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests ofAliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 547 (1961).
74. Id.
75. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, art.
4(2), (4), (5), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 549.
76. Id. art. 5(1)(b), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 549.
77. Id. arts. 6(b), 7(f), (k), 8(b), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 550-51.
78. Id. art. 9(2)(c), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 551.
79. Id. art. 10(5)(c), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 554.
80. Id. art. 12(1)(c)-(4)(b), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 567.
81. Id. art. 13(l)(b), reprinted in Sohn & Baxter, supra note 73, at 575.
82. See generally Lord Arnold McNair, Q.C., The General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized Nations, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1; Friedmann, supra note 71.
83. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 4, at 472-73 (recognizing that investor-
state disputes combine elements of private commerce and public regulation); Coe, supra note 25,
at 1389 (observing that investor-state disputes have "characteristics of inter-state arbitration and
of private international commercial arbitration").
84. BROWNLIE, supra note 56, at 17-18.
85. SHAW, supra note 56, at 95, 97.
86. AMCO Asia v. Indonesia, 23 I.L.M. 351 (ICSID 1984).
87. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
88. Chorz6w Factory (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13); 1925 P.C.I.J.
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Given their role in developing the law of state responsibility and the
minimum standard of treatment for aliens, one would naturally expect
general principles to fall within the scope of "international law" for
purposes of Article 1105(1). By parity of reasoning, the Notes'
exclusion of general principles seem to constitute a significant
amendment to Article 1105(1), absent context or clear evidence of a
special meaning that repudiates them as a foundation of the minimum
standard. In the view of this author, no such context or evidence exists.
While Articles 1116 and 1117 contextually indicate a desire to limit the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism to the obligations
enumerated in Section A of Chapter 11 and two provisions of Chapter
15,89 they do not suggest any desire to eliminate the historical
foundation of the minimum standard enumerated in Article 1105(1).
Turning from context to drafting history, one still finds no evidence
of the intent to develop a special meaning of "international law" that
excludes general principles from the scope of Article 1105(1). After the
Notes appeared, the Pope & Talbot tribunal requested Canada to supply
all drafting history supporting the NAFTA Parties' alleged intent to
restrict "international law" to custom for purposes of Article 1105(l). 90
In some 1,500 pages of documents supplied by Canada, reflecting over
forty drafts of Chapter 11, the tribunal could find no use of the word
"customary" to qualify "international law" in the provision that became
Article 1105(l). 9"
In short, when used to describe the minimum standard of treatment
for aliens, the ordinary and historically accepted meaning of
"international law" includes general principles of law. None of the
relevant context qualifies that meaning for purposes of Article 1105(1).
Nor does drafting history disclose the intent to exclude general
principles from the scope of Article 1105(1). Because the Notes restrict
"international law" to the obligations imposed by customary
international law, they logically purport to exclude general principles as
an independent source and, thus, to amend Article 1 105(1).92
(ser. B) No. 3 (July 26).
89. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
90. Pope & Talbot Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 4, T 37.
91. Id. 43, 46; see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 36, at 337.
92. Two other possibilities exist: First, the drafters of the Notes may not have sought to
amend Article 1105(1), but may have overlooked the historical role of general principles in
developing the minimum standard. Second, even if they recognized the significance of those
principles in developing the minimum standard, they may have surrendered to the careless
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If the Notes so clearly amend Article 1105(1), one must account for
the apparent reluctance of tribunals to challenge their validity. Although
most tribunals have openly accepted or acquiesced in the Notes'
exclusion of independent treaty obligations from the minimum
standard,93 they have quietly revolted against the elimination of general
principles as a source of "international law" for purposes of Article
1105(1). Instead of opining on the Notes in this context, tribunals have
simply ignored them and continued to apply general principles as a
reference point in evaluating claims under Article 1105(1). For
example, the tribunals in ADF Group Inc. v. United States and in
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States expressly referred to "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"94 and "the
principles of justice recognized by the principal legal systems of the
world"95 in their analysis of claims under Article 1105(1). For its part,
the tribunal in Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States defined the
minimum standard to include "generally accepted standards of the
administration of justice."96
Although they did not explicitly refer to general principles, the
tribunals in Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States and in
GAMI Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican States both held that states
may violate the minimum standard through "idiosyncratic" conduct or
through violations of "natural justice."97 Because "idiosyncratic"
conduct suggests a departure from general principles and because many
observers equate "natural justice" with general principles,98 one may
reasonably conclude that the Waste Management and GAMI tribunals
tendency of modern international lawyers to "relegate into 'custom' all those important norms
that cannot be supported by treaties." Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 1946, 1947-48 (1990). It seems unlikely, however, that the Notes' drafters would admit
to such inattentiveness, or that Chapter 11 observers would find the lack of care any more
reassuring than a calculated effort to modify NAFTA's text.
93. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
94. ADF Award, supra note 49, 185 & n.176 (indicating that Article 1105(1) does not
incorporate only "discrete, specific rules applicable to limited contexts" and suggesting that it
also encompasses "more general principles or requirements," including "the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations").
95. Mondev Award, supra note 3, 127 & n.57 (recalling the reliance on general principles by
the Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, supra
note 75, and formulating a similar test based on "generally accepted standards of the
administration of justice").
96. Loewen Award, supra note 3, 133 (quoting Mondev Award, supra note 3).
97. Waste Mgmt. Award, supra note 49, 98; GAMI Award, supra note 48, 89, 96.
98. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 56, at 16; SHAW, supra note 56, at 94; Akehurst, supra
note 70, at 814 n.75.
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understood general principles to fall within the scope of "international
law" for purposes of Article 1105(1). Additionally, while not explicitly
mentioning general principles, the tribunal in United Parcel Service of
America, Inc. v. Canada, defined the minimum standard not by
reference to "customary international law," but by reference to "the
general body of international law,"99 a phrase which many would
construe to include both custom and general principles.'00
Thus, instead of endorsing the Notes, the awards of Chapter 11
tribunals seem to ignore the FTC's action as applied to general
principles of law. Despite the FTC's clear restriction of Article 1105(1)
to customary international law, six tribunals have explicitly or implicitly
continued to regard general principles as a source of law when
evaluating claims under that provision. In so doing, they have offered
partial vindication to those who described the Notes as an ultra vires
amendment that has no binding effect and that tribunals should ignore
until ratified by the three NAFTA Parties in accordance with their
constitutional processes. 0
VI. CONCLUSION
Until now, most assessments of the Notes and their application by
Chapter 11 tribunals have devoted little attention to detail or nuance.
Closer examination reveals that tribunals have given the Notes a mixed
reception. To the extent that the Notes prevent the direct incorporation
of free-standing treaty obligations into the minimum standard, one may
greet them as a reasonable interpretation, as most tribunals have done.
By contrast, to the extent that the Notes purport to exclude general
principles from the minimum standard, one may regard them as an
unlawful and ineffective attempt to amend Article 1105(1). Consistent
with this view, tribunals have quietly led a partial revolt against the
FTC's action by continuing to treat general principles as a source of
"international law" under the minimum standard despite contrary
instructions so clearly expressed by the Notes of Interpretation.
99. UPS Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 3, 77.
100. See BROWNLIE, supra note 56, at 18 ("The rubric [general principles of international
law] may refer to rules of customary law, [and] to general principles of law.....
101. See supra notes 4, 23 & 45 and accompanying text.
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